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CREDITOR AND CONSUMER RIGHTS
by
Joseph G. Chumlea * and John S. Dwyre**
I. USURY, INTEREST, AND THE CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
OST of the usury and Consumer Credit Code' cases decided dur-
ing the Survey period dealt with the issues of contracting for, and
charging, usurious interest. Several cases involved the application
of usury penalties for charging interest during an interest-free period, and
one case contributed to the debate concerning the appropriate calculation of
prejudgment interest in Texas. Because only a small number of cases in-
volved disclosure and compliance under the Credit Code, discussion of those
topics has been incorporated into the following case review and has not been
treated separately.
Many perceive usury law as requiring frustrating involvement in calculat-
ing interest and annual percentage rates and in the complexities of credit
disclosure. An appropriate beginning for a survey of such cases is the com-
plaint of Mr. and Mrs. Midgett against the Edelstein Furniture Company.
In Midgett v. J. Edelstein Furniture Co. 2 a furniture retailer sued the
Midgetts after the Midgetts defaulted on a retail installment contract. The
Midgetts alleged usury as a defense, but failed to verify their usury pleading
as required by rule 93 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.3 On appeal
the Midgetts asserted that the contract was usurious on its face and, there-
fore, exempt from the rule 93 verification requirement.
The contract contained a latent conflict: it disclosed the correct amount
financed, interest rate, and finance charges; however, it also required an ex-
cess number of payments that, if the Midgetts paid, would result in payment
of a sum greater than the actual principal and finance charges. The Midgetts
claimed that the excess amount constituted additional, usurious interest.
The question was whether the court could sufficiently determine any usuri-
ous excess from the record, or whether the court should reject the Midgetts'
usury defense because discerning such usury from the Midgetts' pleadings
* B.A., University of Texas; J.D., University of Houston. Attorney at Law, Phalen,
Chumlea & McQuality, Dallas, Texas. Mr. Chumlea is responsible for preparation of the ma-
terial concerning usury, interest, and the Consumer Credit Code.
** B.A., New Mexico State University; J.D. Texas Tech University. Attorney at Law,
Lubbock, Texas. Mr. Dwyre is responsible for preparation of the material concerning credi-
tors' rights.
1. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN., arts. 5069-1.01 to -51.19 (Vernon 1987) is commonly
referred to as the Consumer Credit Code.
2. 700 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ).
3. TEX. R. Civ. P. 93.
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would involve too many calculations and require consultation with too many
outside sources. The court ultimately held that the mathematics were too
complex and the legal maximum rates were not sufficiently clear from the
record for the court to find usury.4
One dissenting justice felt that the Midgetts should have been permitted to
present evidence of usury.5 The dissent noted that no instrument charging a
usurious interest rate is going to state that rate on its face in unequivocal
terms.6 Consequently, the dissent argued, courts must engage in mathemati-
cal calculations to determine if usury exists.7 The dissent concluded by pro-
viding a calculation based upon the figures in the Midgetts' contract that
reflected the existence of an excessive rate of interest. 8
In Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. v. Fiberglass Insulators9 the court
considered the type of conduct that constitutes a charging of usurious inter-
est under article 5069-1.06.10 Fiberglass Insulators alleged that the
Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. charged prejudgment interest in excess
of the statutory six percent limit set by article 5069-1.03. 1 According to
Fiberglass Insulators, the alleged act of charging occurred at trial during the
direct and cross-examination of the railroad's account manager concerning
Fiberglass's debt. The manager testified that he had been charging interest
to Fiberglass's account since Fiberglass breached its contract with the rail-
road and that ten percent was a fair rate to charge for each year of default.
The account manager's testimony included a calculation of the interest at
ten percent per annum, compounded annually. On cross-examination the
manager stated he was now charging Fiberglass ten percent interest on its
remaining balance.
The court's opinion discussed the debate concerning the proper amount of
prejudgment interest allowable in Texas and the rule that the six percent
limit set by article 5069-1.03 clearly applies to contracts when there is no
agreed-upon interest rate.' 2 The court determined, however, that no charg-
ing of interest under the usury penalty statute had taken place despite the
account manager's clear and unequivocal statements under oath that the
railroad was charging Fiberglass ten percent interest.' 3 This holding in Fi-
berglass Insulators seems at odds with both the facts of the case and the
direction of prior case law. The opinion traced a line of cases discussing the
type of conduct that amounts to a charging. 14 Such conduct includes unilat-
4. 700 S.W.2d at 333-34.
5. Id. at 334 (Utter, J., dissenting).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 339.
9. 707 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
10. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1987).
11. Id. art. 5069-1.03.
12. 707 S.W.2d at 948; see infra text accompanying notes 84-101.
13. Id. at 950.
14. Id. at 949-50.
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erally placing on an account an amount due as interest;15 sending demand
letters for usurious amounts, 16 even though the debtor never receives the
letters;17 and filing a pleading for excessive interest in a lawsuit even though
the pleading is later superseded by an amended pleading omitting the exces-
sive interest.' 8 The majority in Fiberglass Insulators distinguished these
cases on the grounds that the cases did not involve a charging that occurred
for the first time in testimony at trial.19 Since no precedent existed for hold-
ing an oral request for interest made in connection with a judicial proceeding
as a charging, the court concluded that the account manager's testimony was
insufficient to constitute usury.20 The majority's distinction is obviously di-
rected at the timing of allegedly usurious conduct rather than at the conduct
itself. Article 5069-1.06 prohibits any charging of excessive interest, but it
fails to mention a time limit beyond which an excessive charging is permit-
ted.21 Courts have defined the conduct of charging as any act by the prom-
isee constituting or implying a demand for payment. 22 So long as a charging
occurs and the other elements of the cause of action are proven, a usury
finding would seem inevitable.
A justification for the result in Fiberglass Insulators is suggested by the
court's discussion of the judicial confusion over the entitlement of successful
litigants to equitable prejudgment interest at rates as high as twenty percent.
The court indicated that it did not want to punish a plaintiff bold enough to
ask for these higher rates.23 This reasoning perhaps explains the court's
holding better than the court's denial that sworn testimony demanding inter-
est does not constitute a charging under article 5069-1.06.
During the Survey period two Amarillo cases discussed whether the
charging of an unspecified, postmaturity rate of interest results in an agree-
ment to charge interest or whether it is usurious. In Morgan v. Amarillo
National Bank 24 the bank sued several individual partners on guaranty
agreements concerning two loans to the general partner. The loans provided
a floating interest rate tied to the prime rate, and the loans further allowed
that past due principal and interest would bear interest at the highest lawful
rate until paid. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
bank, and the partners appealed, asserting the defense of usury.25 The part-
ners claimed that the postmaturity interest provision was not a specification
15. Butler v. Wright Way Spraying Serv., 683 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1984), rev'd on other grounds, 690 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. 1985).
16. William v. Back, 624 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex. App.-Austin 1981, no writ); Moore v.
Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
17. Williams, 624 S.W.2d at 275.
18. Rick Furniture Distrib. Co. v. Kirlin, 634 S.W.2d 738, 740 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
19. 707 S.W.2d at 950.
20. Id.
21. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1987).
22. Moore v. Sabine Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
23. 707 S.W.2d at 951.
24. 699 S.W.2d 930 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
25. Id. at 933.
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for a definite interest rate. They alleged, therefore, that no agreement for
interest existed and that the six percent rate set by article 5069-1.0326 pre-
vailed. Since the bank admitted charging the floating rate that was in the
contract on past due principal and interest at rates as high as 17.5 percent
per annum, the partners claimed a charging of more than double the lawful
maximum, which required a forfeiture by the bank of all principal and inter-
est. The court saw things differently, however, and held that an agreement
to charge the highest lawful interest rate is proper and does not entitle the
lender to a rate greater than that provided by law.27 Referring to the Texas
Consumer Credit Commissioner's published calculations of usury ceilings,
the court further observed that the rate actually charged by the bank was
well within usury limits.238 Interestingly, that usury is not available as a de-
fense to a guarantor of a note was not addressed in Morgan.29 Also of inter-
est is that the litigants did not complain that postjudgment interest should
have been granted at the highest lawful rate that the contract allowed, that
is, eighteen percent per annum pursuant to article 5069-1.05, section 130
rather than ten percent per annum, which presumably the court awarded
under article 5069-1.05, section 2. 3 1
The court in Dodson v. Citizens State Bank,32 like the Morgan court, con-
cluded that parties to a contract may agree that past due interest will run at
the highest legal rate without the creditor suffering usury penalties for charg-
ing and receiving interest up to that limit.33 The Dodson case involved a
bank's offer to a borrower to combine into a renewal note a preexisting
$250,000 personal note and a $35,000 note of a corporation that the bor-
rower presumably controlled. The borrower rejected the offer and later
claimed that the bank, by including the corporate debt in the offered re-
newal, had required the borrower to assume a third-party debt. The bor-
rower then alleged that the corporate debt should be considered interest
under the rationale of Alamo Lumber Co. v. Gold.34 The Dodson court re-
jected the borrower's argument, stating that the court in Alamo Lumber em-
phasized the lender's refusal to extend credit absent the proposed debtor's
assumption of a third party's debt. 35 The court noted that in Dodson not
26. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1987).
27. 699 S.W.2d at 934.
28. See id.
29. A number of courts have recently held that a usury defense is not available to a guar-
antor of an obligation. See Allied Supplier & Erection v. A. Baldwin & Co., 688 S.W.2d 156,
160 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1985, no writ); Greenway Bank & Trust v. Smith, 679 S.W.2d
592, 594-95 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.). As noted in Chumlea &
Curry, Creditor and Consumer Rights, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 40 Sw. L.J. 159, 163
(1986), the supreme court in Houston Sash & Door Co. v. Heaner, 577 S.W.2d 217 (Tex.
1979), ruled that the usury defense is personal to the debtor and penalty forfeitures in TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06 (Vernon 1987) apply only to the "immediate parties to
the transaction creating the usury defense." Id. at 222.
30. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05, § 1 (Vernon 1987).
31. Id.§2.
32. 701 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
33. Id. at 91.
34. 661 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1983).
35. 701 S.W.2d at 93.
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only did the assumption of the third party's debt not occur, but the bank
later renewed the underlying personal debt and advanced additional funds.36
The court also refused to consider the bank's assumption offer as a charging
of interest under the usury statute.37 Observing that a usury action must
involve proof of an absolute obligation to repay a principal indebtedness, the
Dodson court concluded that since the proposed renewal note, including the
assumption, was only an offer, which the borrower rejected, the underlying
repayment element of the cause of action was missing and, thus, no charging
occurred. 38
In Reagan v. City National Bank NA. 39 the court addressed the issue of
when a contract for interest begins. In Reagan a businesswoman borrowed a
sum of money on October 20, 1981, to purchase a computer for her book-
keeping business. The note's interest rate was 19.5 percent, which was
within the prevailing lawful maximum rate. In 1983 the business was sold to
Elizabeth Reagan, the plaintiff. On September 13, 1983, Reagan signed the
original note document in the space designated "co-maker." The lawful
maximum rate effective on September 13, 1983, was 18.75 percent per an-
num. Reagan defaulted on the note, and the bank sued on the note. Reagan
subsequently counterclaimed for usury.
The Reagan court applied the settled rule that the usurious nature of a
contract is determined as of the time of the contract's inception. 4° Conse-
quently, since the parties agreed that the note's inception was on October 20,
1981, the court held that the interest rate was proper.41 The court further
dismissed Reagan's contention that, by signing the original note in 1983, she
either created a new note or renewed or extended the existing note, thereby
subjecting the bank to the September 1983 maximum rates. 42
The circumstances in the Reagan case are somewhat unique. Neverthe-
less, the holding not only fails to address the root requirement of the rule of
law applied in the case, but it also avoids the article 5069-1.0443 issues of
what contract the parties are suing on and when did the parties execute the
contract. Courts describe a contract as "a deliberate engagement between
competent parties to do or abstain from doing some act for a sufficient con-
sideration." 44 Although the Reagan court is correct in holding that the note
had its inception in 1981, the lawsuit in Reagan nevertheless concerned a
deliberate engagement, between two competent parties, that did not exist
prior to September 13, 1983. The settled rule of law applied in the case
seems to require courts to identify the date of formation of the contract be-




39. 714 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
40. Id. at 428.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.04 (Vernon 1987).
44. Smith v. Thornhill, 25 S.W.2d 597, 599 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930), rev'd on other
grounds on reh'g, 34 S.W.2d 803 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, holding approved).
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1.04,45 which allows the parties to any written contract to agree on any rate
of interest that does not exceed an indicated rate ceiling as calculated for the
week prior to the date of the rate contract. This language requires courts to
identify the parties to the contract and the date they contracted for the par-
ticular interest rate in question.
The court in Reagan concluded that the parties did not create a new note
in 1983.46 Even so, Reagan was not a guarantor of the note, and contractual
obligations between Reagan and the bank did not exist prior to September
13, 1983. 47 Article 5069-1.04 would, therefore, seem to impose the usury
ceilings in effect for the week preceding September 13, 1983, which would
require a finding of usury.
A determination of whether a transaction constituted one loan that might
be usurious, or two nonusurious loans was involved in Scalise v. McCal-
lum. 48 In Scalise the debtor gave an original, purchase money note to ac-
quire a tract of land for development as a shopping center. The note bore
interest at 9.5 percent per annum and matured after seven months, at which
time interest on any unpaid principal increased to ten percent. When the
note became delinquent the seller threatened foreclosure under a deed of
trust securing the note. Prior to foreclosure the parties entered into a settle-
ment agreement. Under the settlement agreement the debtor paid approxi-
mately eighty percent of the outstanding principal in return for a release of
the seller's lien on the land. The debtor also executed a new $10,000 note
and assumed the seller's debt for the broker's commission that arose out of
the original sale of the land. The debtor later filed suit alleging the new
consideration given in the settlement agreement constituted interest on a re-
newal of the original loan and was usurious.
The court, without addressing the complicated issue of whether the new
consideration legally was interest, determined that the two transactions were
so incompatible with one another that they could not be construed as one
loan transaction or even as a renewal transaction. 49 Examining the obliga-
tions and rights of the parties under the original note and deed of trust and
under the settlement agreement, the court concluded the settlement agree-
ment was obviously a new and substituted agreement superseding and extin-
guishing the original agreement. 50 The Scalise court essentially applied the
same standard that the supreme court applied in Lawler v. Lomas & Net-
tleton Mortgage Investors.51 Since the settlement agreement was not other-
wise tainted with usury, the Scalise court rendered judgment in favor of the
seller on the $10,000 note.52
45. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.04(a) (Vernon 1987).
46. 714 S.W.2d at 428.
47. The Reagan opinion notes there was no dispute that Reagan went to City National
Bank on September 13, 1983, and signed in the space designated "co-signer" the same note
originally executed in 1981. Id. at 426.
48. 700 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
49. Id. at 684.
50. Id.
51. 691 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1985).
52. 700 S.W.2d at 685.
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In Coppedge v. Colonial Savings & Loan Association 5 3 the Dallas court of
appeals found that a lawyer's demand letter for back interest in connection
with a real estate loan was a charging under article 5069-1.06. 54 Since the
charging and receiving occurred after an early pay-off of the loan, the court
also found that the spreading and refund provisions of article 5069-1.07(a) 5-
were not applicable as a defense. 56 The borrowers in Coppedge paid off their
thirty-year home mortgage after approximately six and one-half years.
Three months after the early pay-off the lender's lawyer claimed in a de-
mand letter that the borrowers had previously sold the property in violation
of the due-on-sale provision in the deed of trust, and the lawyer demanded
$9,100 as back interest. The title company later delivered to the lender the
sum, which had been escrowed at the time of the early pay-off of the loan.
Approximately eight months later, after being threatened with suit, the
lender returned the $9,100 with interest to the borrowers. In the ensuing
usury suit the Dallas court reversed a summary judgment for the lender and
handed down a judgment for usury penalties. 57 In one of the few opinions
addressing the statutory spreading doctrine of article 5069-1.07(a) the court
ruled that article 5069-1.07(a) was intended to prevent an otherwise nonusu-
rious loan from becoming usurious simply because of an early pay-off.58 The
court viewed the statute as permitting a lender to refund any excessive inter-
est resulting from an early pay-off as a credit against any remaining princi-
pal.59 Since the lender's unilateral act of charging interest after the early
pay-off created the usurious excess in Coppedge rather than the early pay-off
itself, the court determined that article 5069-1.07(a) had no application to
the case. 6°
The court in Coppedge also upheld the trial court's summary judgment
against the borrowers' common law action to recover all of the interest paid
on the loan. 61 Disagreeing with the decision of the Amarillo court of ap-
peals in West v. Commercial Credit Equipment Corp. 62 the Dallas court held
that the borrowers could not recover all of the interest paid in a usurious
transaction. 63 Instead, the court ruled that the borrowers must elect be-
tween a common law action for the excessive interest only and the article
5069-1.06 penalty of three times the excess.6
Danziger v. San Jacinto Savings Association 65 concerned the usurious ef-
fect of escrowing loan proceeds by agreement. The borrower in Danziger
53. 721 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ requested).
54. TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.06(1) (Vernon 1987).
55. Id. art. 5069-1.07(a).
56. 721 S.W.2d at 938.
57. Id. at 941.
58. Id. at 937-38.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 938.
61. Id. at 938-39.
62. 677 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
63. Id. at 939.
64. Id.
65. 708 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1986, writ granted).
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made a home improvement loan subject to chapter five of the Credit Code. 66
The lender allegedly escrowed the loan proceeds and paid them out to the
borrower's home improvement contractor over an eleven-month period.
The borrower later claimed no true escrow existed, and that since the lender
had complete control over the money, the rule in First State Bank v. Miller67
applied, rendering all, or at least some, of the loan proceeds as interest. The
Miller court based its decision upon the usury rule that the true principal of
a loan is that amount of money that the borrower actually can use. 68 Under
the Miller principle a court may declare as interest any sum concealed in a
loan or, as was the case in Miller, any sum frozen in escrow. 69
The Danziger court declined to accept the borrower's Miller argument be-
cause the court found that some evidence of a true escrow account existed
and that since the money from the account was used to pay the contractor,
the borrower had use of the money.70 The court noted that in Miller the
lender placed the loan proceeds in the borrower's account and then froze
$14,000 of the proceeds to insure payment of interest.71 The Danziger court
viewed the lender's use in Miller of the borrower's frozen funds as general
operating capital to make other loans as the determining factor in rendering
the captive funds as interest. 72 The court found that no similar circumstance
existed in Danziger.73
The borrowers in Danziger also alleged that the escrow procedure violated
the single cash advance requirement for chapter five secondary mortgage
loans. Specifically, the borrower claimed that the requirement in article
5069-5.02(2) that interest be computed on "the cash advance at the time the
loan is made" 74 prohibited a loan being made in more than one advance.
The lender did not dispute this interpretation. The lender, however, claimed
that it had made a single advance to the borrower's escrow account and that
the multiple payments out of the account did not constitute multiple ad-
vances on the loan. The court agreed with the lender and emphasized that
the borrowers had agreed to the payment procedure and had acknowledged
receipt of the loan proceeds when they were paid into the escrow account.75
The borrowers argued that they were nevertheless deprived of the use of the
escrowed funds while the funds were in escrow. To the extent that article
5069-5.02(2) requires a single cash advance on secondary mortgage loans,
one might question what material differences exist between a prohibited mul-
tiple advance loan and the escrow procedure utilized in Danziger.
66. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-5.01 to .05 (Vernon 1987) (secondary mort-
gage loans).
67. 563 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1978).
68. Id. at 575.
69. Id.
70. 708 S.W.2d at 3-4.
71. Id. at 3.
72. Id. at 3-4.
73. Id. at 4.
74. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-5.02(2) (Vernon 1987).
75. 708 S.W.2d at 5.
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In Ceco Corp. v. Steves Sash & Door Co. 76 the court held that charging
interest during an interest-free period on an open account constituted usury.
In a case reminiscent of the circumstances, if not the name, of Houston Sash
& Door Co. v. Heaner,77 Steves Sash & Door Co. sued Ceco for $71,702.95
on a sworn account arising from the sale of 1600 doors for the San Antonio
Hyatt Regency Hotel. Steves's shipping order stated that payment was due
thirty days from the invoice date and that a service charge would be imposed
at the highest rate allowable for each month, or fraction thereof, that the
account was past due. Steves sent Ceco an invoice for the doors on October
23, 1981, and it included a service charge of $245.69, which Steves described
as arising from a "past due invoicefrom date of invoice [August 31, 1981] to
Sept. 30, 1981."78 The court of appeals cited Heaner as authority for render-
ing judgment in favor of the debtor, Ceco.79 According to the court, by
imposing an interest charge from August 31, 1981, through September 30,
1981, Steves obviously charged Ceco interest during a period that was sup-
posed to be free from interest.80 Interestingly, the interest-free period in this
case was based upon an agreement between the parties that no interest
would be due for the first thirty days after the date of the invoice, whereas
the rule in Heaner was founded upon the statutory thirty-day interest-free
period under article 5069-1.03.81 The court in Ceco indicated that the result
would have been the same, usury, even if the terms in the shipping order
constituted an agreement to charge interest.8 2 The court's conclusion is de-
batable to the extent that it sanctions the imposition of usury penalties for
the breach of an agreement not to charge interest, as opposed to the imposi-
tion of penalties for violations of a statute limiting interest rates. Neverthe-
less, the creditor in Ceco suffered the cancellation of its claim, as well as a
judgment against it for $94,251.50, which represented principal actually
paid, a $2000 usury penalty, and $37,000 in attorneys' fees.83
The recurring question concerning the proper rate for prejudgment inter-
est was squarely and thoroughly discussed in Missouri-Kansas-Texas Rail-
road Co. v. Fiberglass Insulators.84 This case, as already discussed, involved
a usury judgment resulting from an alleged charging of ten percent interest
that occurred during the testimony of the creditor's accounts manager at
trial. The creditor, on appeal, contended that ten percent was a lawful pre-
judgment rate under article 5069-1.05,85 the postjudgment interest statute.
The court dismissed the creditor's contention by noting that article 5069-
1.03 clearly and unambiguously limits the rate of prejudgment interest in all
contract cases to six percent per annum when the contract fails to specify a
76. 714 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1986, writ requested).
77. 577 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. 1979).
78. 714 S.W.2d at 325 (emphasis added by court).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1987).
82. 714 S.W.2d at 324.
83. Id. at 328.
84. 707 S.W.2d 943 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
85. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (Vernon 1987).
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rate.86 The court recognized, however, that a sizable group of Texas and
federal courts had, on equitable grounds, approved prejudgment interest
rates at the higher, postjudgment rates contained in article 5069-1.05.8 7 Nev-
ertheless, the Fiberglass court declined to follow those cases because they not
only ignored explicit limits set by article 5069-1.03, but also misinterpreted
prior Texas Supreme Court authority. 88
The Fiberglass court identified the holding in Behring International, Inc. v.
Greater Houston Bank 8 9 as clearly, but incorrectly, addressing and explain-
ing this equitable prejudgment interest theory.90 According to the Fiberglass
court, the Behring decision rested in part upon the supreme court's decision
in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stahl Petroleum Co.91 The court in Fiberglass
stated that although Stahl recognized the possibility of the recovery of pre-
judgment interest in equity for the use of detention or money, the case did
not hold that such equitable prejudgment interest could be awarded in excess
of the statutory six percent limit when a contract or an account was in-
volved.92 The court in Fiberglass read the Stahl opinion to stand for the
proposition that an equitable prejudgment interest rate is to be the legal rate,
the rate that article 5069-1.03 identifies as legal.93
The Fiberglass opinion discussed no less than five federal decisions that,
according to the court, incorrectly allowed equitable prejudgment interest at
the postjudgment rates authorized by article 5069-1.05.94 Observing that
these opinions reflected the law's confusion, 95 the Fiberglass court stated
that the holding in Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. National Union Fire
Insurance Co. ,96 the most recent and perhaps most often cited of the federal
decisions, ignored the 1980 Texas Supreme Court holding in Miner-Dederick
Construction Corp. v. Mid-County Rental Service, Inc. 97 that the proper rate
for prejudgment interest in contract cases is six percent.98 According to Fi-
berglass, the court in Crown misinterpreted the Stahl decision and miscon-
ceived the issues in Cavnar v. Quality Central Parking, Inc. 99 The Fiberglass
court correctly observed that Cavnar only permitted equitable prejudgment
interest at the higher article 5069-1.05 rates with respect to wrongful death,
86. 707 S.W.2d at 945.
87. Id.
88. Id. The Fiberglass court identified the misinterpretation of Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Stahl Petroleum Co., 569 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1978), and the court noted that the cases under
consideration neglected the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Miner-Dederick Constr. Corp.
v. Mid-County Rental Serv., Inc., 603 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1980), that the proper rate of prejudg-
ment interest is six percent per annum.
89. 662 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ).
90. 707 S.W.2d at 946.
91. 569 S.W.2d 480 (Tex. 1978).




96. 768 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1985).
97. 603 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. 1980).
98. 707 S.W.2d at 947.
99. 696 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1985).
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survival, and personal injury actions. °° Fiberglass concluded that in con-
tract cases with no agreed rate of interest prejudgment interest is limited to
six percent by article 5069-1.03.101
A final case concerning usury, Village Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Porter,102
held that article 5069-6A.05(2)10 3 did not require the seller of a mobile home
to disclose the existence of a prior outstanding lien on the home. After buy-
ing a used mobile home the purchaser in Porter discovered that in addition
to a number of defects in the mobile home, the home was subject to an out-
standing lien held by a mortgage company that had financed the original sale
of the home. The buyer of the used home sued the seller for violating the
Credit Code's requirement that all known creditors be identified. 10 4 In re-
viewing the case the Porter court used a statutory definition of the term
"creditor" that addressed the relationship of the alleged creditor to the
buyer's credit transaction. 10 5 Since the buyer in Porter did not have a credit
relationship with the previous mortgage company, the court concluded that
the Credit Code did not require the seller to inform the buyer of the mort-
gage company's outstanding lien even though the seller knew of the lien's
existence.10 6 This finding prevented the assessment of a $4000 penalty under
chapter 8 of the Credit Code. 10 7 The court, however, apparently found that
the seller's conduct constituted a violation of the provisions of the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act (DTPA)10 8 concerning the failure to disclose material
facts to a buyer. 10 9
II. SECURED CREDITORS' DUTY TO DEBTORS-NOTICE AND A
COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE DISPOSITION OF COLLATERAL
A. No Summary Judgment on Sworn Account
In Achimon v. JIL Case Credit Corp. 110 the trial court dismissed a creditor
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment in a deficiency suit on a sworn
account because the creditor's sworn pleadings failed to allege facts of no-
tice, including the date that proper notice was given to the defendant debtor,
and facts of the commercially reasonable sale. On appeal the creditor argued
that the trial court erred in dismissing its motion because rule 185111 barred
the debtor from denying the debt. Rule 185 mandates that a debtor who
wishes to resist a suit on a sworn account must file a written denial, under
oath, or waive the right to deny the claim on the debt. 1 2 The creditor ar-
100. 707 S.W.2d at 948.
101. Id.
102. 716 S.W.2d 543, 551 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ).
103. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6A.05(2) (Vernon 1987).
104. Id.
105. See 716 S.W.2d at 551.
106. Id.
107. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 5069-8.01 to .06 (Vernon 1987).
108. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.826 (Vernon Supp. 1987).
109. 716 S.W.2d at 549.
110. 715 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).




gued that because the debtor failed to make a sworn denial, rule 185 pre-
cluded the debtor from denying the claim, and that, therefore, summary
judgment was appropriate. The court analyzed the creditor's cause of action
and found that the creditor failed to state that the debt was owed on a sworn
account.' 13 The court held that the creditor's burden of proving that the
sale was made pursuant to the Business and Commerce Code114 was not met
merely by the debtor's failure to answer with a sworn denial. 15 Further, the
court held that because the creditor failed to assert facts related to the com-
mercial reasonableness of the sale, it failed to establish a liquidated money
demand under rule 185.116 A concurring opinion in the case also pointed to
the deficiencies in summary judgment proof concerning notice and commer-
cially reasonable sale as grounds for denying the creditor's motion for sum-
mary judgment.1 17
B. Disposal Sales-Notice Does Not Have to be Written
Since the 1982 Texas Supreme Court decision in Tanenbaum v. Economics
Laboratory, Inc. 118 the success of a deficiency judgment has often depended
upon whether the creditor gave the debtor adequate notice of the sale of
collateral 19 as required by section 9.504 of the Texas Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC).120 In MBank Dallas, N.A. v. Sunbelt Manufacturing, Inc. 121
the court considered section 9.504's "reasonable notification" requirement.
The undisputed evidence in MBank indicated that MBank had failed to give
written notice before it sold Sunbelt's collateral. Some evidence existed,
however, that MBank orally notified Sunbelt of the time and place of the
disposal sale. The jury answered a special issue regarding notice in MBank's
favor.122 The trial court, however, granted judgment n.o.v. on the notice
issue. 123 Because of the trial court's decision regarding notice, there was a
take-nothing verdict against MBank.124 The court of appeals reversed, hold-
ing that section 9.504(c) only required MBank to send Sunbelt reasonable
notice of the time and place of the proposed sale. 125 The interpretation of
113. 715 S.W.2d at 75.
114. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
115. 715 S.W.2d at 76.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 77 (Stephens, J., concurring).
118. 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982).
119. See, e.g., First City Bank v. Geux, 677 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tex. 1984); Commercial Credit
Equip. Corp. v. West, 677 S.W.2d 669, 678 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Barr
v. White Oak State Bank, 677 S.W.2d 707, 711 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Gentry v. Highlands State Bank, 633 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984,
writ ref'd).
120. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987) provides:
"reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of
the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent
by the secured party to the debtor. .. ."
121. 710 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
122. Id. at 635.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 635-36.
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"send" in section 9.504(c) was central to the court's determination. 126 Also,
the court recognized that the phrase "reasonable notice" was not defined in
the Texas UCC and that other jurisdictions were split on the term's mean-
ing. 127 The court, therefore, analyzed the UCC definition of "send" in con-
junction with the definitions of "notifies" and "gives" notice. 128 The court
concluded that formal notice, whether written or oral, is only one factor in
determining whether or not there was reasonable notification of the disposal
sale.129 Since the record supported the jury's answer regarding the suffi-
ciency of MBank's oral notice to Sunbelt, the court ultimately rendered
judgment on the jury's verdict and reversed the trial court's judgment
n.o.v.
13 o
C. FDIC Excused from Notice Requirement
A question arises concerning the applicability of the Texas UCC when the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) becomes a creditor by virtue
of taking over a failed bank. Is a debtor who gives up collateral subsequent
to an FDIC takeover entitled to the notice guaranteed under section 9.504?
Because of the large number of Texas banks and savings and loans that have
failed, one Nebraska case, FDIC v. Ritchie,1 31 is important because Ne-
braska, like Texas, absolutely bars any recovery for a deficiency judgment
from a debtor who received inadequate notice of the sale of collateral. 132
Ritchie may cause each of us who borrows money to pause and consider the
meaning of the advertising slogan, "This bank is insured by the FDIC."
In Ritchie a bank creditor initiated an action against an individual for a
deficiency judgment after the collateral that secured the debtor's note was
sold. The state trial court granted the debtor's motions for judgment and
dismissal based upon grounds that the debtor had not been given proper
notice as required by section 9.504 of the Nebraska UCC.133 The creditor
appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court. While the appeal was pending,
the FDIC took over the creditor bank. The FDIC was substituted as plain-
tiff in the action, and it removed the action from state court to federal dis-
trict court.
In simplest terms, the FDIC argued that if the court upheld the notice
126. See id.; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(38) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
127. 710 S.W.2d at 635-36. The MBank court asserted that other jurisdiction had held
that written notice must be given to a debtor prior to a disposal sale. Id. See Executive Fin.
Serv., Inc. v. Garrison, 722 F.2d 417, 419 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying Missouri law); Savings
Bank v. Booze, 34 Conn. Supp. 632, 382 A.2d 226, 228 (Super. Ct. 1977); McKee v. Missis-
sippi Bank & Trust Co., 366 So. 2d 234, 238 (Miss. 1979); DeLay First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co.
v. Jacobsen Appliance Co., 196 Neb. 398, 243 N.W.2d 745, 749 (1976); Foundation Discounts,
Inc. v. Serna, 81 N.M. 474, 468 P.2d 875, 877 (1970).
128. 710 S.W.2d at 636; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(26) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968).
129. 710 S.W.2d at 636 (citing Crest Inv. Trust, Inc. v. Alatzas, 264 Md. 571, 287 A.2d
261, 264 (1972)).
130. Id. at 638.
131. 646 F. Supp. 1581 (D. Neb. 1986).
132. Id. at 1583.
133. NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-504 (1980).
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requirement, the FDIC would lose the case. If, however, the court did not
require notice, the FDIC would win even though the bank it insured would
lose. The federal district court applied federal common law134 and created a
rebuttable presumption that the FDIC met all of the notice requirements. 135
The court found that presumption should apply when the FDIC attempts to
recover a deficiency judgment following a commercially reasonable sale. 136
In essence, the holding recognized that the bank would lose the deficiency
judgment action because of its failure to provide notice of the sale, but that
the bank's insurer and successor in interest may win regardless of the failure.
The effect of the decision is to allow the FDIC to take over a bank that has
violated the statutory commercial law of a state, yet, by invoking the federal
common law, escape the statutory sanctions of the bank's violations. This
holding has severe implications for bank patrons. Because a bank's regula-
tory reports are protected from public scrutiny, 137 a bank patron has no
warning that its bank is in danger of collapse or has mismanaged other pa-
trons' accounts. The bank patron must, therefore, depend on the govern-
ment to insure that all goes well.
Every bank insured by the FDIC touts its status proudly. Member banks
display the FDIC emblem at their entrances and advertise that the banks
and their depositors are insured by the FDIC. Perhaps, in light of Ritchie,
truth-in-lending 138 should require the following notice just below the FDIC
seal:
WARNING: ACCOUNTS OF DEPOSIT ARE INSURED BY
THE FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION. ALL
BORROWERS ARE ADVISED THAT THE FDIC MAY, WITH-
OUT NOTICE OR HEARING TO YOU, TAKE THE ASSETS OF
THE BANK INCLUDING ITS LOAN TO YOU. IF THE FDIC
TAKES THE ASSETS, YOUR OTHERWISE VALID CLAIMS OF
FRAUD, CONVERSION, USURY, AND IMPROPER NOTICE
MAY NOT BE VALID AGAINST THE FDIC, EVEN AS A SET-
OFF OF THE AMOUNT YOU OWE.
134. The Ritchie court used the test set forth in United States v. Kimball Foods, Inc., 440
U.S. 715 (1979), to determine whether state or federal law controlled the case. The three
considerations under Kimball Foods are "whether the federal program is one which by its
nature requires nationwide uniformity, whether adopting state law would frustrate the specific
objectives of the federal program, and whether applying federal law would disrupt commercial
relations predicated on state law." 646 F. Supp. at 1583 (citing Kimball Foods, 440 U.S. at 728-
29). The Ritchie court answered all three considerations in favor of the FDIC. Id. at 1583-84.
135. 646 F. Supp. at 1584.
136. Id.
137. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8) (1982) (bank matters contained in reports concern-
ing bank's examinations, operation, or condition are exempt from disclosure if prepared for, or
under guidance of, agency responsible for regulating or supervising bank).
138. Compliance with the requirements of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (1982) (Truth-in-Lend-
ing Act) is enforced under the provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1818 (1982) (termination of status as
insured bank) against both federal and state banks belonging to the FDIC. Nothing, however,
requires the FDIC to inform bank customers that it has the ability to raise defenses and immu-
nities to claims and actions for set-off. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1982).
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III. Lis PENDENS
One case during the Survey period discusses whether mandamus is proper
to cancel lis pendens. Under section 12.007 of the Texas Property Code lis
pendens is proper when an action is pending that involves title to real prop-
erty, an interest in real property, or an encumbrance against real prop-
erty.139 In Hensley-Spear of Texas, Inc. v. Blanton 140 the court determined
that lis pendens is not proper when the lien sought only affects real property
collaterally and not directly. The court held that mandamus is proper to
compel a trial judge to cancel lis pendens not properly issued within the
provisions of section 12.007 of the Texas Property Code.141 The court went
on to state that there is no need to comply with the statutory methods of
cancelling a lis pendens under section 12.008 of the Property Code 142 if the
lis pendens does not comply with section 12.007.143
IV. THE FTC RULE-No STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON SET-OFF
According to one case decided during the Survey period, a consumer pay-
ing on a retail installment contract has, in certain circumstances, defenses
against the holder of the contract even after the statute of limitations has run
on a claim against the original vendor. In Cooper v. RepublicBank Gar-
land 144 the court addressed the effect of the statute of limitations on a con-
sumer note, the procedural requirements to preserve the claim, and the
liability of the party holding the consumer credit installment contract. The
plaintiffs in Cooper purchased a pool under an installment sales contract.
The vendor immediately assigned the contract to RepublicBank. In accord-
ance with Federal Trade Commission regulations, the contract bore the FTC
rule legend. 145
After discovering several serious defects in their pool the Coopers brought
suit against the vendor for breach of warranty, seeking declaratory relief in
the form of a set-off.'4 6 The Coopers continued making their monthly pay-
ments to RepublicBank under the installment contract while the suit was
139. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.007 (Vernon 1984).
140. 699 S.W.2d 643 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1985, no writ).
141. Id. at 645.
142. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 12.008 (Vernon 1984).
143. 699 S.W.2d at 645.
144. 696 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
145. In accordance with the requirements of 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1984) (FTC rule) the in-
stallment contract bore the following legend:
NOTICE-ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT
IS SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE DEBTOR
COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS OR SERVICES
OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH THE PROCEEDS
HEREOF, RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE DEBTOR SHALL NOT
EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
696 S.W.2d at 631.
146. Although the court characterized the Cooper's action as a claim, it is important to
note that a set-off is a defense to payment. The court's rationale clearly demonstrates that the
set-off is a defense, not an affirmative claim.
1987]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
pending. The trial court rendered judgment against the vendor,147 but the
judgment was never satisfied. Subsequently, the Coopers notified Repub-
licBank that they were discontinuing their installment payments. The
Coopers also demanded that the bank cancel the contract and return all the
monies that they had paid thereunder. RepublicBank responded by threat-
ening to foreclose on the pool if the Coopers ceased to perform the contract.
In a suit against RepublicBank for rescission of the contract and, alterna-
tively, for declaratory relief in the nature of an offset the Coopers contended
that the bank was responsible for their claim against the vendor by virtue of
the contract's FTC rule legend and the existing judgment against the vendor.
The Coopers conceded that the statute of limitations would have run on
their claim against RepublicBank had the claim accrued when they first dis-
covered the vendor's breach. The Coopers argued, however, the statute of
limitations did not bar their claims because the statute commenced running
only after the bank repudiated the contract by refusing to comply with the
demand for rescission. The trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment
against the Coopers, finding that the statute of limitations barred both the
Coopers' defense against the vendor as well as their claims against Repub-
licBank for rescission and offset. 148
The court of appeals held that the FTC rule allowed debtors to assert
against a holder of a credit contract claims or defenses arising out of the sale,
but not new claims or defenses. 49 Since the Coopers could have included
RepublicBank in their original suit against the vendor, their claim against
the bank accrued when the vendor's breach was discovered.1 50 The court
went on to hold, however, that with respect to consumer installment sales
contracts the statute of limitations did not bar declaratory relief in the form
of an offset of damages.151 The court noted that the contract's FTC rule
legend placed RepublicBank in the vendor's shoes.1 52 The court reasoned
that the FTC rule denied RepublicBank, as the holder of the contract, any
benefits that it might otherwise have under the holder-in-due-course doc-
147. 696 S.W.2d at 630.
148. Id. at 632-33.
149. Id. at 632.
150. Id. at 632-33.
151. Id. at 634. The Cooper court relied on Morris-Buick Co. v. Davis, 127 Tex. 41, 91
S.W.2d 313 (1936), which provided:
It is the law of this state that where the subject-matter of a defense... consti-
tutes an independent cause of action which does not go to the foundation of the
plaintiff's demand, it cannot effect a reduction of the amount of the plaintiff's
recovery except by way of set-off, and the statutes of limitation are available in
respect to such defense. On the other hand, if the subject matter of the defense
be of an intrinsically defensive nature, which, if given effect, will operate merely
as a negation of the plaintiff's asserted right to recover, or in abatement, either
wholly or partially, of the amount claimed, the statute of limitation does not
apply.
Id. at 43, 91 S.W.2d at 314 (citations omitted).
152. Although not stated, it is clear that those statutes of limitations defenses that would be
effective for the vendor would also be effective for the assignee of the note, RepublicBank. The
court did not suggest that a claim for breach of warranty existed against RepublicBank.
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trine. 153 The court observed that the FTC rule, therefore, prevented the sep-
aration of the Coopers' duty to pay from the vendor's duty to perform. 15 4
The Cooper court was nevertheless concerned about the inherent unfairness
that would result if RepublicBank was forced to pay on the judgment against
the vendor without having the opportunity to appear and defend itself at
trial. 155 The court allowed the Coopers an offset, however. 156
Cooper teaches two practical lessons. First, a buyer's defenses are avail-
able so long as money is due under the contract. Second, note holders must
be sued within the vendor's statute of limitations in order to assert claims
under the contractual provisions of the FTC rule. As a practical matter, suit
must be filed simultaneously against the current holder of a disputed install-
ment contract and the vendor.
V. AVAILABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Availability of Punitive Damages Under the DTPA
In Nabours v. Longview Savings & Loan Association 157 a majority of the
Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule of law prohibiting the award of
punitive damages absent an award of actual damages. The dissent, however,
criticized the court's five-to-four decision in Nabours as an analytical blun-
der that discarded over one hundred years of Texas common law. 158
Nabours initiated a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief and damages when his
home mortgage lender posted the Nabourses' home for foreclosure. In his
complaint Nabours alleged common law fraud, violation of the DTPA, and
waiver of foreclosure right. The trial court held that a consent clause in the
mortgage was violated; therefore, the court enjoined the lender from fore-
closing on the Nabourses' home. 159 The court denied Nabours's claim for
both actual and punitive damages because the jury found no diminution in
the market value of the Nabourses' house. On appeal both the court of
appeals and the Texas Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's holding. 16°
The Supreme Court decision is solvent as to the reason the injunction was
granted.
The majority criticized the plaintiff for limiting the damages that the jury
could consider to the decrease in market value of the Nabourses' home at-
tributable to the lender's misconduct. 16 1 The majority speculated that if the
jury's consideration of actual damages had not been so limited, a finding of
damages may have been made. 162 Since the jury found no actual damages,
153. 696 S.W.2d at 632 (citing De La Fuente v. Home Savings Ass'n, 669 S.W.2d 137, 142
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1984, no writ)).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 633.
156. Id. at 634.
157. 700 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex. 1985) (5-4 decision).
158. Id. at 905 (Kilgarlin, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 902-03.





however, the court relied on dictum in the City Products Corp. v. Berman 163
decision to deny Nabours's claim for punitive damages even though injunc-
tive relief had been granted. 164
The logic of requiring actual damages to allow an award of punitive dam-
ages is founded on the basic premise that punitive damages must bear some
reasonable proportion to actual damages. 165 Although such a rule of reason-
able proportion is not a rigid rule, 166 it is one of several factors considered in
determining the appropriateness and reasonableness of an award of punitive
damages. 167 The ratio between punitive damages and actual damages serves
as one gauge of the effect of bias, prejudice, or passion on a jury. 168
The general rule is that punitive damages are recoverable only after proof
of a distinct, willful tort, whether the action arises out of tort, contract, or a
plea for equitable relief. 169 Since actual damages are an element of the tort,
punitive damages are contingent on a finding of actual damages. 170 Thus,
only a finding of actual damages will support an award of punitive
damages. 171
The majority conceded that when rescission is warranted, punitive dam-
ages may be awarded; when conveyances induced by fraud are involved and
a court orders the return of property, punitive damages are approved. 172
The property's return is deemed to be a substitute for actual damages. 173
The majority approved a jury finding of the value of the property returned to
the plaintiff. 174
The dissent, written by Justice Kilgarlin and joined by Justices Spear,
Ray, and Robertson, criticized the majority opinion in harsh terms. Accord-
ing to the dissent, the majority's approach of rigidly adhering to the require-
ment of actual damages ignored that Nabours spent four years and
thousands of dollars defending the title to his home. 175 The dissent asserted
that the nature of the defendant's conduct, not the particular remedy sought,
should determine the availability of punitive damages. 176 The dissent as-
serted that the majority decision was inconsistent with the court's decision in
International Bankers Life Insurance Co. v. Holloway.177 According to the
163. 610 S.W.2d 446 (Tex. 1980).
164. 700 S.W.2d at 904 n.2.
165. Id. at 904 (citing Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1981);
Southwestern Inv. Co. v. Neeley, 452 S.W.2d 705, 707-08 (Tex. 1970); International Bankers
Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567, 584 (Tex. 1963)).
166. Alamo Nat'l Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1981).
167. Id.
168. 700 S.W.2d at 904 (citing with approval Nolan v. Bettis, 577 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
169. Id.
170. The majority clearly limited its decision to the facts in this situation. In this case a




174. Id. at 904-05.
175. Id. at 907-09.
176. Id. at 906-07.
177. 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963).
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dissent, the Holloway court affirmed a recovery of exemplary damages when
the plaintiff there did not recover actual damages. 178 The Holloway decision,
as interpreted by the dissent, mandates the recovery of punitive damages
whenever the defendant's conduct amounts to a willful tort, regardless of
whether the plaintiff seeks a legal or equitable remedy.1 79 Such punitive
damages are consistent with equitable notions of deterrence of condemnable
conduct. 1 80
Since both the majority and dissent in Nabours cited Holloway with ap-
proval, Nabours must be read in light of the Holloway holding. The majority
cautioned that its holding in Nabours should not be construed as an absolute
refusal to award punitive damages to plaintiffs seeking equitable relief.' 8'
Although the plaintiff in Nabours was ultimately granted equitable relief and
nothing else, the majority purportedly subscribes to the theory that Texas
courts, contrary to the apparent majority rule, will not deny exemplary dam-
ages simply because the action is equitable rather than legal.18 2
The court's holding in Nabours only confuses the issue of when equitable
relief will also sustain an award of punitive damages. The Nabours court
provides no litmus test; nor does it give any indication as to what factors the
court will consider in allowing punitive damages. Thus, the holding is sure
to breed future litigation on this issue.
B. Recovery of Punitive Damages in Tort
Possibly as a sign of the economic times, the Survey period has seen an
increase in banks' collection efforts against cosigners of notes. The cases
concerning unsuccessful attempts by banks to collect debts are especially
noteworthy. In particular, Texas National Bank v. Karnes 183 is an example
of how not to handle the repossession of secured property.
The bank in Karnes held a security interest in a van as the result of a
purchase money loan to a nineteen-year-old debtor. The debtor's parents
cosigned the note. In addition to the automobile loan, the debtor's parents
also kept a joint account at the bank. After the debtor defaulted on the car
loan the bank repossessed the van and charged the $3,474.41 still due on the
note to the cosigner parents' joint account.
Although the bank repossessed the van in May of 1979, it had not dis-
posed of the collateral at the time of the trial, July 9, 1984. The bank admit-
ted that its procedure in handling the van was not "recommended as
standard operating procedure[] for use by secured creditors."' 84 In fact, the
bank admitted that it failed to comply with the disposition provisions of
178. 700 S.W.2d at 909.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 905.
182. Id.
183. 711 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. App.-Beaumont), rev'd per curiam, 717 S.W.2d 901 (Tex.
1986).
184. 711 S.W.2d at 391.
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chapter 9 of the Texas UCC.185
In affirming the trial court's judgment awarding the plaintiffs actual dam-
ages for the lender's breach of contract, the court of appeals held that every
aspect of a disposition of collateral after repossession must be commercially
reasonable, including "the method, manner, time, place and terms" of the
disposition.18 6 The court's conclusion that the lender in this case failed to
make appropriate efforts to dispose of the collateral 87 implies that im-
pounding the van for five years with no disposition, as a matter of law, was
not a commercially reasonable disposition of the collateral. Since the bank
failed to make a commercially reasonable distribution of the collateral, the
court ruled that the bank lost its right to any set-off deficiency.
1 88
The appellate court also affirmed the trial court's judgment awarding the
plaintiffs exemplary damages. 189 The bank had argued that exemplary dam-
ages are not available for a simple breach of contract.190 The court of ap-
peals held, however, that a tort accompanied the breach of contract in the
case, and thus, exemplary damages were available to the plaintiffs. 191 The
court concluded that the bank committed seven acts of a tortious nature
towards the plaintiffs and that each tort was a separate, independent, and
distinct injury justifying some exemplary damages.1 92 The appellate court
did, however, remit the jury's award of $50,000 in exemplary damages to
$20,000.193 The court specifically disapproved of the trial court's finding
that attorney's fees constituted an element of actual damages to be consid-
ered in awarding punitive damages.1 94 Rather, the court of appeals held that
185. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987) provides:
"[s]ale or other disposition may be as a unit or in parcels and at any time and place and on any
terms but every aspect of the disposition including the method, manner, time, place and terms
must be commercially reasonable."
186. 711 S.W.2d at 392; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon Supp. 1987).
187. 711 S.W.2d at 392-93.
188. Id. at 393.
189. Id. at 397.
190. The bank cited A.L. Carter Lumber Co. v. Saide, 140 Tex. 523, 168 S.W.2d 629
(1943).
191. 711 S.W.2d at 393.
192. The court found that the bank committed torts against the Karneses in seven ways:
1. In failing to make a reasonable disposition of the collateral;
2. In keeping possession of the collateral beyond a reasonable time;
3. In taking or converting the money out of the [Karneses'] savings account
after losing its right to offset;
4. In failing to notify ... [the Karneses] of the deduction from their savings
account;
5. In concealing the fact from [the Karneses] ... that the bank had deducted
from their savings the sum of $3,474.41 for the period of time from July, 1979,
to December, 1979;
6. In failing to return the certificate of title to the van while holding possession
of the van from May, 1979, to July, 1984; and,
7. In failing to establish the value of the collateral in a commercially accepta-
ble manner and within a reasonable time after repossessing the same.
Id. at 396.
193. Id. at 397.
194. Id.
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attorney's fees were in the nature of compensation. 195
The supreme court, in a per curiam decision, 196 struck down the court of
appeals' award of attorney's fees and punitive damages. 197 The award of
attorney's fees was reversed because the court of appeals based the award on
unassigned error. 198 According to the supreme court, the parties did not
raise the issue of the trial court's failure to award attorney's fees; therefore,
the matter was not properly brought before the court of appeals for
adjudication.199
The supreme court also reversed the award of punitive damages and noted
that punitive damages are generally not recoverable for breach of con-
tract.20° A party seeking punitive damages in an action on a contract must
obtain a finding of an independent tort with actual damages accompanying
the contract breach.20 1 The supreme court held that the court of appeals
exceeded its authority by implying actual damages in tort.20 2 The supreme
court noted that actual damages were awarded only in connection with the
bank's failure to dispose of the collateral in a commercially reasonable man-
ner.20 3 The court found that the plaintiffs' cause of action sounded only in
contract because section 9.504204 rights to a commercially reasonable dispo-
sition are implied covenants in contract.20 5 Since the cause sounded in con-
tract no punitive damages were available.20 6
By emphasizing that the plaintiffs in Karnes did not prove actual damages
in tort, the court protected the viability of future claims in tort based upon
facts similar to those in Karnes. While holding against the plaintiffs in
Karnes on procedural grounds, the court seemed to warn financial institu-
tions by expressly refusing to condone the bank's practices. 20 7
VI. GARNISHMENT
One case decided during the Survey period serves as a particularly pun-
gent reminder that garnishees must comply with the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure or suffer the consequences. In First National Bank v. Peterson 20 8 the
bank had a policy of simply freezing any garnished accounts and waiting
until someone contacted them. The bank's policy did not include filing a
sworn written answer in response to the writ of garnishment as required by
195. Id.
196. 717 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1986).
197. Id. at 903.
198. Id.
199. Id.; see Central Educ. Agency v. Burke, 711 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Tex. 1986).
200. 717 S.W.2d at 903; see Jim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex.
1986).
201. 717 S.W.2d at 903.
202. Id.
203. Id
204. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
205. 717 S.W.2d at 903.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. 709 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ).
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rule 667.20 9 At the time the bank received the writ of garnishment at issue
the bank held $312.68 in the debtor's account. When the bank failed to file
its sworn answer, a default judgment was entered against the bank in the
amount of $48,831.77, together with post-judgment interest and costs. 210
The trial court refused to grant a new trial, and the bank appealed.
The court of appeals, relying on Butler v. Dal Tex Machine & Tool Co.,211
affirmed the trial court and concluded that the fact that three bank officers
read the writ of garnishment and did not obtain assistance in understanding
the citation constituted negligence and conscious interference.212 The court
of appeals flatly rejected the bank's plea for a new trial based upon equitable
principles. 213 The court distinguished Sunshine Bus Lines v. Craddock21
4
and rejected the bank's contention that it made a good faith attempt to com-
ply with the writ. 215 The validity of a default judgment, the court insisted,
cannot be tested merely by the amount of the judgment ultimately en-
tered.216 That the judgment was entered for a sum much greater than the
amount garnished did not, ipso factor, require a new trial.217 The result in
Peterson should caution all financial institutions to maintain adequate proce-
dures to insure that the procedural requirements of rule 667 are strictly ob-
served in order to avoid liability on a default judgment.
VII. HOMESTEAD-IMPROVEMENTS MADE WITH EMBEZZLED FUNDS
During the Survey period one court intimated that homestead protection
is available even for embezzled funds when it refused to allow a forced sale
of a homestead that was improved with embezzled funds. In Curtis Sharp
Custom Homes, Inc. v. Glover 218 the defendant used embezzled funds to im-
prove an existing homestead. The victim of the embezzlement brought a
civil suit against the defendant and received actual damages and an equitable
lien on the defendant's homestead property. The judgment was not satisfied,
so the victim filed suit to foreclose on the defendant's homestead. The trial
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the
equitable lien could not be foreclosed because the property was the defend-
209. TEx. R. Civ. P. 667 provides:
If the garnishee fails to file an answer to the writ of garnishment at or before the
time directed in the writ, it shall be lawful for the court, at any time after judg-
ment shall have been rendered against the defendant, and on or after appearance
day, to render judgment by default, as in other civil cases, against such garnishee
for the full amount of such judgment against the defendant together with all
interest and costs that may have accrued in the main case and also in the gar-
nishment proceedings.
210. 709 S.W.2d at 277.
211. 627 S.W.2d 258 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
212. 709 S.W.2d at 279.
213. Id. at 279-80.
214. 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939) (default judgment may be set aside if defendant
was not culpable and if plaintiff would not be prejudiced).
215. 709 S.W.2d at 280.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. 701 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ).
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ant's homestead.21 9 The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the
Texas Constitution protects all homesteads against forced sale for payment
of all debts.2 20
The majority opinion in Glover provoked a strong dissent that pointed out
that the use of the stolen money for home repairs created a constitutionally
valid and foreclosable lien in the embezzlement victim. 221 Although a valid
home repair lien technically requires that the improvements be contracted
for in writing,222 the dissent noted that the victim of an embezzlement would
most likely never receive such a writing. The dissent argued that if the
money for the improvements to the homestead were borrowed rather than
stolen, the lender would certainly have the necessary document to create a
foreclosable lien. 223 Thus, the dissent contended that the majority's holding
penalized the honest borrower while it insulated the wrongdoer from
foreclosure.
The essence of this case is that a victim of embezzlement sought and ob-
tained a judgment and an equitable lien in a homestead. The victim, how-
ever, has received no money, but rather has had the court of appeals award
costs against it. 2 24 If this result was intended by the Texas Constitution,
perhaps a new criminal exception to the homestead exemption should be
added to the constitution.
VIII. DTPA-ATTORNEY'S FEES
A major case decided during the Survey period suggested that successful
DTPA plaintiffs may not be entitled to attorney's fees for DTPA actions in
equity. Until Nabours v. Longview Savings & Loan Association225 it was
thought that the plain language of section 17.50(d) of the DTPA226 would
219. Id. at 24.
220. Id. at 28; see TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 50.
221. 701 S.W.2d at 29 (Akin, J.).
222. TEX. CONsT. art. XVI, § 50.
223. 701 S.W.2d at 29.
224. Id. at 28.
225. 700 S.W.2d 901 (Tex. 1985); see supra text accompanying notes 157-82.
226. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon 1984) (Deceptive Trade Practices
Act) provides:
(b) In a suit filed under this section, each consumer who prevails may ob-
tain:
(1) the amount of actual damages found by the trier of fact. In addition the
court shall award two times that portion of the actual damages that does not
exceed $1,000. If the trier of fact finds that the conduct of the defendant was
committed knowingly, the trier of fact may award not more than three times the
amount of actual damages in excess of $1,000;
(2) an order enjoining such acts or failure to act;
(3) orders necessary to restore to any party to the suit any money or prop-
erty, real or personal, which may have been acquired in violation of this sub-
chapter; and
(4) any other relief which the court deems proper, including the appoint-
ment of a receiver or the revocation of a license or certificate authorizing a per-
son to engage in business in this state if the judgment has not been satisfied
within three months of the date of the final judgment. The court may not re-
voke or suspend a license to do business in this state or appoint a receiver to take
1987]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
allow prevailing consumers under the DTPA to recover attorney's fees even
when the statutory relief sought was purely equitable. 227 In Nabours, how-
ever, a majority of the Texas Supreme Court refused to award attorney's fees
to a plaintiff who successfully sought to enjoin a lender from wrongfully
foreclosing on a home. The court held that the plaintiff failed to recover
statutory damages under the DTPA; thus, the plaintiff was not entitled to
recover attorney's fees under the DTPA.228
It is difficult to determine what the supreme court meant by this holding.
In addition to providing generous money damages, one of the purposes of
the DTPA would seem to be to prevent the effects of unlawful conduct by
injunction, restoration, or other relief.229 The Texas Legislature's descrip-
tion of the private remedies available for violations of the DTPA230 leaves
little doubt that the legislature intended the DTPA to prevent damages as
well as compensate for them; three out of the four specific statutory remedies
created by the DTPA are equitable in nature.231
IX. SPECIAL ISSUES-SUBMISSION OF GLOBAL SPECIAL ISSUES
During the Survey period the Texas Supreme Court considered the propri-
ety of submitting global special issues to juries on such complex matters as
waiver and performance. In Island Recreational Development Corp. v. Re-
public of Texas Savings Association 232 Island Recreational purchased a mort-
gage commitment from Republic for $40,000. After the original
commitment expired Island purchased a second commitment for $20,000.
The second commitment obligated Republic to fund all of Island's loans that
closed prior to the expiration of the commitment. After the second commit-
over the affairs of a person who has failed to satisfy a judgment if the person is a
licensee of or regulated by a state agency which has statutory authority to re-
voke or suspend a license or to appoint a receiver or trustee. Costs and fees of
such receivership or other relief shall be assessed against the defendant.
(c) On a finding by the court that an action under this section was ground-
less and brought in bad faith, or brought for the purpose of harassment, the
court shall award to the defendant reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees and
court costs.
(d) Each consumer who prevails shall be awarded court costs and reason-
able and necessary attorneys' fees.
227. See D. BRAGG, J. LONGLEY & P. MAXWELL, TEXAS CONSUMER LITIGATION § 8.13
(2d ed. 1985).
228. 700 S.W.2d at 905.
229. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (Vernon 1984) describes the DTPA's purpose
as follows: "This subchapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purposes, which are to protect consumers against false, misleading, and deceptive business
practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty and to provide efficient and eco-
nomical procedures to secure such protection."
230. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (Vernon Supp. 1987) enumerates those reme-
dies available to the private consumer, while id. § 17.44(c)-(e) enumerates remedies available
to the state. In both instances a fundamental remedy is the right to a statutory injunction.
231. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1987) describes the pri-
mary damage remedy available to consumers under the DTPA. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 17.50(d)(2)-(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987) enumerates the consumer's equitable remedies
under the DTPA.
232. 710 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1986).
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ment lapsed Island asserted a right to an additional loan. Island claimed
that it technically complied with the commitment by filing a loan application
the day before the commitment expired. Republic contended that Island's
application failed to satisfy the commitment, and therefore, Republic denied
its obligation to fund the loan. Island brought suit for breach of the commit-
ment, alleging that Republic waived its right to strict compliance with the
commitment's terms.
The trial court purportedly submitted both the issue of Island's perform-
ance and the issue of Republic's alleged waiver to the jury in a very broad,
conclusory form of special issue often referred to as a global special issue.
The special issue incorporated the result of Republic's alleged waiver into
one central inquiry concerning Island's performance under the commit-
ment.233 On its face the special issue submitted to the jury appeared to
address only the issue of Island's performance. Furthermore, no instruc-
tions explaining the relevance of Republic's alleged waiver accompanied the
special issue. Neither party, however, objected to the lack of instructions.
The trial court rendered judgment for Island after the jury found that Island
had performed all of the conditions precedent to its right to demand a loan
under the commitment. 234 The court of appeals reversed the trial court and
remanded the case because the special issue did not fairly raise the issue of
waiver. 235
On appeal before the Texas Supreme Court, Republic argued that the trial
court erred in submitting a single global issue to the jury rather than two
distinct issues on waiver and performance. Republic asserted that the trial
court's submission of a global issue favored Island because it blended the
issue of Island's performance and Republic's alleged waiver, thereby giving
the jury unbridled discretion to decide for Island.
In affirming the trial court's judgment a majority of the supreme court
gave unqualified approval to the use of global special issues in general.
2 36
The majority approved the Island Recreational type of submission and stated
that although the issue form underemphasized the waiver issue, the error did
not prejudice Republic. 237 The majority noted that the critical issue was
whether Island performed the conditions required by the commitment and
therefore had a right to the disputed loan, and that this issue of performance
was submitted by the trial court to the jury.238 As a result, the majority
concluded that the form of the issue was sufficient and that neither the ab-
sence of the waiver issue nor the lack of instructions on the waiver issue were
fatal. 239
233. Although both parties objected to the issue's breadth, the trial court submitted the
following special issue to the jury: "Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that
plaintiffs performed their obligations under the commitment letter in question?" Id. at 554.
234. Id. at 553.
235. 680 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1984), rev'd per curiam, 710 S.W.2d 551
(Tex. 1986).
236. 710 S.W.2d at 554.
237. Id. at 554-55.




The majority's holding provoked two independent dissents, both of which
argued that the global form of special issue was not a broad submission of
two issues but rather the submission of a single issue on performance.
24 °
The dissents argued that the failure to distinguish the issues prejudiced Re-
public by allowing Island "two bites at the apple"; 24 1 that is to say, the jury
could find for Island by determining either that Island performed its obliga-
tions under the commitment or that Republic waived the required perform-
ance. 24 2 The dissent criticized the use of global special issues because the
drafter of the special issues can defend their form by simply arguing that
they are broad enough to encompass all of the relevant issues in a case.
243
Further, according to the dissent, submitting such all-encompassing forms of
special issues produces jury verdicts unattuned with recognized theories of
recovery and makes review of the judgments virtually impossible. 244
The supreme court's decision in Island Recreational removes all doubt
concerning the viability of global special issues in Texas. By approving the
use of global special issues, however, the court has complicated appellate
review of special issues and, in effect, altered rule 279's scheme of objection
burdens. 245 Hereafter, Island Recreational dictates that any party objecting
to the breadth of a particular special issue either (1) object to the form's
complexity before it is submitted; (2) request the contemporaneous submis-
sion of accompanying instructions identifying and explaining the incorpo-
rated issues; or (3) risk a deferential appellate review of the form based upon
no record of the jury's rationale.
240. Justice Spears, dissenting, noted "[t]his charge simply does not submit waiver and
performance broadly, but only submits performance specifically." Id. at 558. Justice Gonza-
lez, also dissenting, remarked "the submitted issue does not ask about waiver .... Id. at 562.
Justice Gonzalez further noted, "the word 'waiver' does not appear in the issue," id at 564,
rather, "[tihe liability issue submitted to the jury only addresses performance," id. at 561 n.1.
241. Id. at 563.
242. In his dissent Justice Spears noted that the special issue could have been reworded to
raise both the issue of performance and the issue of waiver by explicitly incorporating the
waiver issue and adding an accompanying instruction. Justice Spears suggested the following
issue:
Do you find from the preponderance of the evidence that [plaintiff] performed
all of the obligations under the commitment letter which [defendant] did not
waive?
You are instructed that waiver is defined as intentionally giving up a known
right.
You are instructed that performed means carrying out obligations as required by
the contract.
Id. at 557 n.I.
243. Id. at 563 (Gonzales, J.).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 564. Justice Gonzalez argued in dissent that since Island bore the burden of
proving Republic's waiver, TEX. R. Civ. P. 279 allocated to Island the burden of incorporating
the waiver issue into the special issue form. 710 S.W.2d at 564. Under rule 279, therefore, if
Island failed to include the waiver issue, it failed to prove its case. Approving the form of
special issue used in the instant case, according to Justice Gonzalez, effectively shifted the rule
279 burden to Republic because the waiver issue's presence in the special issue is presumed
unless Republic objects. See id. at 265. As a result, the majority's holding shifts the affirma-
tive duty to act, and the risk of failing to act, from Island to Republic in contravention of rule
279. See id.
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